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pringtime brought forth April showers and May flowers — and also
federal and provincial budgets that, for this year, had mixed tax policies.
Although some tax measures aimed to reduce rates and broaden tax bases,
many governments increasingly rely on targeted tax credits, which
complicate the tax system without necessarily improving the prospects for
economic growth or fairness.
If governments remain on this tax reform path, the accumulation of targeted
tax relief measures will have a significant fiscal cost, which could be better used to
finance broad rate reductions. Tax rate reductions encourage greater work effort,
investment and risk-taking without governments putting themselves in the
position of picking winners from losers, a task at which they rarely succeed.
Credits have been adopted or enhanced in the past two years for activities
such as sports, transit passes, film making, research, labour training and
manufacturing and forestry equipment. Tax reductions have also been targeted to
small businesses, thereby creating greater opportunities for personal and corporate
tax avoidance. A notable exception: New Brunswick, which is revising its far-too-
low small business corporate income tax rate, boosting it from 1 to 5 percent.
The general philosophy that we need to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases
is being eroded by federal and provincial targeted tax relief. We should get back
on track and pursue the objective of having a simple, transparent and fair tax base
with low, internationally competitive tax rates.
The most important federal tax change this year has been a range of increased
capital cost allowances for structures, computers, natural gas distribution lines
and liquefied natural gas facilities and clean energy generation. A two-year write-
off for manufacturing equipment will be available on a temporary basis until
2009.
1 Previous commitments by Liberal and Conservative governments mean that
federal corporate income tax rates will decline from 22.12 to 18.5 percent by 2011. 
Given the federal government’s innovative approach, in its March budget, to
helping cover the cost of capital tax reductions, virtually all provinces are now
phasing out general capital taxes within the next few years.
2 In most cases,
personal tax changes focus on tax credits. However, several provinces delivered
broad personal tax cuts, including British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
and Quebec, the latter in its controversial May budget.
In this Backgrounder, we assess for the first time federal and provincial tax
policies in terms of their impact on the cost of doing business.
3 In our assessment,
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The authors wish to thank several reviewers for their comments that helped improve the
analysis.
1 The accelerated capital cost deduction for oil sands is also being appropriately phased out. As we
focus on non-resource industries, the effect of this provision is not included in our analysis. 
2 The federal government is providing a transfer based on additional federal corporate taxes
resulting from the elimination of provincial capital taxes that are deductible from corporate
income. Nova Scotia is to eliminate the general capital tax in 2012. Manitoba will eliminate its
capital tax by 2011 if fiscally able to do so. Several provinces are maintaining capital and
insurance premium taxes on financial and insurance companies.
3 As discussed below, the tax competitiveness analysis is based on the assumptions that labour
taxes cause production costs to rise by 30 percent of taxes paid (the rest borne by workers as
lower wages) and investment-related taxes cause costs to rise by the full amount of taxes since
large companies must earn profits sufficient to cover financing costs determined in ....we find that income, payroll, capital and sales taxes on labour and capital account
for an extraordinary share of tax-inclusive incremental (marginal) production
costs: 24.3 percent in 2007, which is 2.6 percentage points less than in 2006. In
2007, Ontario is the most highly taxed province with levies accounting for 30.2
percent of tax-inclusive production costs. At the other extreme, New Brunswick
and Alberta are the most fiscally advantaged provinces with taxes tallying up to
15.9 and 18.7 percent of the cost of doing business, respectively. Alberta’s
advantage is primarily the result of low personal income taxes and the absence of
a general payroll and sales tax. For its part, New Brunswick has received a helping
hand from the federal government’s Atlantic investment tax credit, but the
province has also been cutting business taxes in the past several years. Such
differences can have a dramatic impact on business location — a 40 percent
difference between Alberta’s effective tax rate on the cost of doing business and
that of Ontario, results in roughly 12 percent more firms operating in Alberta
(Beaulieu, McKenzie and Wen 2004).
Growth-oriented service sectors face the highest tax rates with communications
the most heavily taxed industry — at 32.5 percent of tax-inclusive costs. By
comparison, the export-challenged forest industry has the greatest advantage on
the tax front, with taxes accounting for 19.6 percent of costs. Manufacturing is the
second-least taxed industry at 22.8 percent.
Taxation of capital is particularly important since it directly affects the ability
of businesses to invest in new technologies. Canada lags its international peer
group, with investment per worker $700 below the OECD average and $1,300
below the United States (Banerjee and Robson 2007). Even with a sharp reduction
in the Canada-wide effective tax rate on marginal investment projects
4 — from
36.6 percent in 2006 to 30.9 percent in 2007
5 — much of the relief has been targeted
at two sectors, forestry and manufacturing, which have been provided accelerated
capital cost deductions. The most important provisions, related to manufacturing
and processing equipment and the Quebec capital tax credit, are only temporary.
They thereby significantly affect the timing of investment rather than having a
long-run impact on competitiveness (House and Shapiro 2006). If the federal and
Quebec governments had accelerated permanent tax reductions instead, the
manufacturing and forestry sectors would be almost as well off in the short term
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footnote 3 cont’d
.... international markets. Mintz (2001) estimated the effect of both taxation and spending on the
cost of doing business  for Canada and the United States but not for each province. In this paper,
we only examine taxation impacts across the provinces. We also do not include research
development grant subsidies and tax credits, given that grant data are not easily available by
province and industry.
4 Marginal investment projects are those that earn a profit rate just sufficient to cover the cost of
capital and taxes.
5 In Quebec, the province increased investment tax credits under the capital tax for manufacturing
and forestry equipment in 2007. The credits can be claimed up to the amount of capital tax paid
by a company. In our “base” case, we assume that credits cannot be fully claimed resulting in no
capital tax paid by the forestry and manufacturing company. However, if credits are fully
claimed, the effective tax rate on marginal investment is substantially reduced in Quebec for
manufacturing and forestry since additional investment drives down capital taxes paid not just
on marginal, but also infra-marginal projects (see footnote 17 for further elaboration).and would have benefited far more from a long-run reduction in their cost of
capital. Other industrial sectors, too, would have faced less taxation on their
capital investments.
A New Approach to
Measuring Tax Competitiveness
We compare effective tax rates on the cost of doing business by province and
industry, using certain assumptions. Businesses, when maximizing their profits,
produce output at the point which the price is equal to marginal (incremental) cost
of producing one more unit of a product or service. The marginal cost of
production depends on the cost of hiring labour and capital, including taxes. All
else equal, business will shift production to the location where incremental costs
are least. With lower taxes, businesses will be willing to produce more goods and
services in those jurisdictions.
For example, suppose it costs $2.00 to produce a widget, inclusive of all taxes
that apply to income, sales, payroll and capital. If taxes were eliminated, suppose
the cost of production would fall by 50 cents. This implies that taxes make up a
quarter of the cost of doing business (50 cents divided by $2.00). Following
McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf (1997), we compute effective tax rates on capital and
labour as the two factors used in producing goods and services in an industry and
aggregate these effective tax rates to measure the effective tax rate on the cost of
doing business.
6
When increasing taxes, costs may not go up by the full amount of the tax,
depending upon its economic incidence (who bears the tax). Businesses must
absorb the tax as a cost and charge higher prices to make up for the loss in profits,
or bargain for lower input prices, implying that wages paid to employees and
profits paid to owners of capital would earn less after-tax income. For large
companies that finance capital from international markets, the presumption is that
taxes only result in higher production costs. There is little alternative because
Canadian businesses cannot bargain for lower international financing costs.
Investors easily shift funds to markets where after-tax returns on investments are
higher. As for labour, higher taxes would result in either higher wage costs borne
by employers or lower income paid to employees. Given labour’s bargaining
power, worker mobility within Canada, and losses in the demand for and supply
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6 The effective tax rate on marginal costs of production is estimated as T = αtL+ (1-α)tK with α
denoting the labour cost share of production, tL denoting the effective tax rate on labour costs
and tK denoting the effective tax rate on capital. This formulation is based on the so-called
Leontief production functions with a fixed ratio of capital to labour (an alternative would be a
geometric average of effective tax rates based on the Cobb-Douglas production function, which
would make little difference to the analysis). The effective tax rate on labour is equal to the
difference between the gross wage paid for labour, including employer payroll taxes and the net-
of-tax wage received by workers divided by the gross-of-tax wage (income, employee payroll
taxes, and sales taxes on goods and services reduce gross wages). The effective tax rate on capital
is equal to the difference between the gross and after-tax rates of return on capital as a proportion
of the gross-of-tax rate of return on capital. All effective tax rates on costs are expressed as a
proportion of tax-inclusive costs.of effort owing to taxation, we assume that 30 percent of labour taxes are borne by
employers.
7
We measure effective tax rates as the amount of taxes paid as a proportion of
the pre-tax income earned by employees from additional effort. For these effective
tax rates, we include personal income taxes, employer and employee federal and
provincial payroll taxes,
8 and sales taxes on income spent on goods and services
currently or in the future. Our estimates are based on the earnings distribution of
workers across provinces and industries, which result in a variation of marginal
tax rates across income levels.
9
Effective tax rates on capital include federal and provincial corporate income
taxes, provincial capital taxes and retail sales taxes on capital inputs.
10 We estimate
these effective tax rates as the annualized value of taxes paid as a proportion of
the gross rate of return on capital that would be sufficient to cover taxes and the
cost of financing capital (see Chen 2000).
The estimates below focus on effective tax rates for large companies, which
raise capital from international markets. Using labour earnings data, we calculate
weighted-average marginal personal tax rates on workers who are employed by
these large companies.
What We Have Found
We begin with a review of the effective tax rates on the cost of doing business,
which is then followed by an examination of the tax components for labour and
capital.
Taxes on the Cost of Doing Business
The effect of taxation on the cost of doing business is strikingly high across
provinces, as shown in Figure 1, despite some progress as a result of the 2007
round of budgets. There has been some reduction of the effective tax rate on tax-
inclusive costs, from 26.9 to 24.3 percent, across Canada.
11 The promised
reductions in corporate taxes and the expected personal income tax reductions will
further reduce the effective tax rate on costs to 23.0 percent in 2011.
Effective tax rates on tax-inclusive costs vary sharply by province. In 2007,
Ontario is the most highly taxed province, with an effective rate of 27.6 percent.
The next highest-taxed province is Manitoba, at 25.2 percent, followed by Prince
4 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
7 See a recent study by Bingley and Lanot (2002) who suggest over 30 percent of income taxes are
shifted forward. This result is consistent with past studies in Canada, as discussed in Bird and
Mintz (1992).
8 We do not include workers’ compensation premiums as most provinces use experience-rating to
determine risks and premium rates.
9 The analysis does not take into account the effect of income-tested benefits on effective tax rates
on labour.
10 Due to lack of data by industry, no non-residential property taxes are included although a
significant amount of property tax is reflected in lower real estate prices.
11 If all labour taxes are borne by employers, the marginal effective tax rate on costs would be about
41.1 percent in 2007, down from 43.0 percent in 2006.Edward Island at 24.3 percent. New Brunswick is the least-taxed jurisdiction at
15.9 percent, followed by Newfoundland and Labrador at 18.2 percent.
12
These budget changes are welcome in improving Canada’s tax competitive-
ness, even if they are not as large as they could be. For 2007, the largest reductions
are in New Brunswick (4 percentage points) followed by Saskatchewan (3.8
percentage points), reflecting not just federal but also provincial tax reductions.
Across industries (Figure 2), the 2007 effective tax rates on tax-inclusive costs
vary, with forestry facing the lowest effective tax rate, at 19.6 percent, followed by
manufacturing at 22.8 percent. The communications sector is the most heavily
taxed sector, at 32.5 percent, followed by public utilities at 27.8. In part, these
differences in effective tax rates across sectors reflect labour intensity since
effective tax rates on capital have a stronger impact on costs than labour taxes
(even though overall effective tax rates on labour are higher than on capital as
shown in Figures 3 and 4).
By 2011, taxes on the tax-inclusive cost of doing business will have changed
little from 2007 levels in most provinces (Figure 1). The largest reduction will be in
Manitoba, with a 3.8 percentage point reduction to 21.4 percent (assuming that
Manitoba does eliminate its capital tax), followed by Saskatchewan, with a 1.7
percentage point reduction to 21.2 percent, and Ontario, with a 1.6 percentage
point reduction to 26.0 percent. Ontario will remain the highest-taxed province in
2011, and New Brunswick will remain the lowest, at 14.7 percent.
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Figure 1 Effective Tax Rates on Cost of Doing Business by Province – 









































Note: Assuming 30 percent of taxes on labour are borne by employers. 
Source: C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.
12 If employers bear the full cost of labour taxes, Alberta would be the least-taxed province at 34.3
percent, followed by New Brunswick at 36.5 percent. Ontario would be the highest taxed no
matter how much labour taxes are shifted forward as higher costs to businesses.Quebec’s tax on the tax-inclusive cost of doing business does not budge as
much as expected, despite the passing of the February and May 2007 budgets.
Assuming that the enhanced capital tax credits in 2007 for manufacturing and
forestry do eliminate overall capital tax payments, Quebec’s effective tax rate by
2011 falls from 23.7 to 22.1 percent (Figure 1). However, if capital taxes are not
fully eliminated by credits in these two industries, there would be little change in
the effective rate on costs. Personal tax reductions will modestly reduce the tax
cost of labour, but these could be offset by an increase in the effective tax rate on
capital. Even with the reductions in the federal corporate rate and the welcome
elimination of the provincial capital tax, the expiration of accelerated deduction
for manufacturing equipment and investment capital tax credits for forestry and
manufacturing will offset the relief.
Taxes on the cost of doing business in 2011 will fall from 2007 levels for most
sectors except in forestry and to a limited extent in manufacturing. Although the
latter two sectors benefit from federal cuts to corporate income taxes as do others,
the expiration of temporary accelerated cost write-offs more than offsets the
benefits from corporate income and capital tax reductions at the federal and
provincial levels.
How High are Taxes on Work Effort?
Workers bear the brunt of taxation with high personal income, payroll and sales
taxes. As shown in Figure 3, the Canadian effective tax rate on labour across
sectors, provinces and employment incomes is 45.9 percent, down slightly from
6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Figure 2 Effective Tax Rate on Cost of Doing Business by Industry – 
















































Note: Assuming 30 percent of taxes on labour are borne by employers. 
Source: C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 7
46.0 percent in 2006.
13 Thus, a typical Canadian worker receives somewhat less
than 55 percent of any additional pre-tax earnings that would be earned from
extra work or bonuses.
14 As economic studies have shown, the effect of such high
effective tax rates on employment income is to reduce the incentive to work,
especially for secondary workers in the family (de Mooij, Evers and van Vuuren
2006).
In 2007, labour effective tax rates are highest in Quebec at 49.8 percent and
lowest in Alberta at about 39.2 percent (Figure 3). Newfoundland and Labrador
this year introduced a set of tax reduction measures by lowering personal income
tax rates and by eliminating a 9 percent surtax effective July 1, 2007, which
reduces the provincial-only effective personal tax rate on labour by 2.5 percentage
points, from 16.3 percent to 13.8 percent. The most significant contributors to
effective tax rates on labour are federal and provincial personal taxes —about 35
percent of pre-tax income — followed by federal and provincial sales taxes —
about 7 percent of pre-tax income (Tables 1 and 2).
13 Note that the effective tax rates on labour as reported in this section are the “full” rates. For
effective tax rates on costs, we scale down effective tax rates on labour to reflect the assumption
that 30 percent of the taxes are absorbed by employers as higher wages.
14 The marginal tax rates would be higher if we also accounted for clawback rates of income-tested
benefits as discussed in Mintz (2006). However, in these calculations, we also include employer-
paid payroll taxes, which have a similar impact on employment income available to workers as
do employee payroll taxes.







































Source: C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.The main reduction in personal tax rates taking place after 2007, leaving aside
indexation of tax brackets,
15 was introduced in the Quebec May budget; namely,
personal tax relief beginning 2008. The effect of the May budget is to reduce the
effective tax rate on labour in Quebec from 49.8 percent to 48.4 percent. The drop
in effective tax rates is modest because Quebec is raising its personal income tax
bracket thresholds. Broadening the tax brackets has only a limited impact in
encouraging greater worker supply and employment since most workers would
continue to face the same marginal personal tax rate on additional income
received from extra labour effort even though their average tax rate (taxes as a
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21.1 34.9 38.8 40.0 43.5 47.6 
Prince Edward Island 19.2 32.0 36.7 36.7 40.4 46.0 
Nova Scotia 20.0 34.0 38.3 38.3 41.9 46.1 
New Brunswick 20.2 34.1 38.0 38.0 41.6 45.8 
Quebec 17.8 38.6 40.5 42.6 45.9 49.8 
Ontario 23.0 36.4 38.8 39.9 43.4 47.4 
Manitoba 20.3 33.9 37.7 38.9 42.5 46.2 
Saskatchewan 20.5 32.8 36.3 36.3 40.0 42.8 
Alberta 23.6 33.3 35.5 35.5 39.2 39.2 
British Columbia 22.3 32.3 35.7 35.7 39.4 43.3 
Aggregate 21.6 35.5 38.0 39.0 42.5 45.9 
Source:  C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.
15 We have not included a possible federal cut to the GST rate because the tax reduction has not
been legislated.












Forestry 23.8 39.5 40.6 41.7 45.1 48.4 
Manufacturing 23.4 39.3 41.2 42.5 45.8 49.2 
Construction 24.2 37.5 38.5 39.3 42.8 45.1 
Transportation  22.2 36.6 38.3 39.5 42.9 46.2 
Communications 23.9 39.5 41.7 42.8 46.1 49.4 
Public utility 23.7 40.1 41.1 42.4 45.7 48.9 
Wholesale Trade 22.7 36.8 39.0 40.2 43.6 46.9 
Retail Trade 18.3 29.7 34.2 35.5 39.3 42.9 
Other services 20.2 33.2 36.3 36.9 40.6 44.1 
Aggregate 21.6 35.5 38.0 39.0 42.5 45.9 
Source:  C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 9
share of income) would decline. If marginal personal tax rates were cut instead,
the effect on work effort would have a greater impact on competitiveness.
How Much are Taxes on Capital?
Although politicians often claim that taxes levied on capital investments fall on
the rich and powerful, more evidence suggests that workers bear the brunt of
corporate taxation. A recent UK paper (Arulampalem, Devereux and Maffini 2007)
estimated that 54 percent of the corporate tax reduces employment income in the
short run while more than 100 percent of the tax falls on employment income in
the long run due to reduced worker productivity. Corporate taxes have little short-
run effect on the Toronto Stock Exchange after-tax profitability earned by
shareholders (Mintz 2006), thereby implying that corporate tax ultimately falls
primarily on labour incomes, consistent with the UK study.
Effective tax rates on capital have been sharply declining during 2006 and 2007
across the provinces (Figure 4a) but, as remarked, primarily in the case of two
industries, manufacturing and forestry (Figure 4b). By 2011, the Canada-wide
effective tax rate on capital will be further reduced to 27.8 percent, with further
federal corporate rate and provincial capital tax reductions, whose impact will be
blunted somewhat by the expiration in temporary tax preferences. Thus, the
acceleration of broad corporate tax rate reductions would have achieved a greater
and more sustained reduction in effective tax rates compared to temporary credits.
By 2011, New Brunswick will have the lowest effective tax rate on capital (2.0
percent). The province will benefit from the federal Atlantic investment tax credit
for resource (including forestry) and manufacturing industries and the elimination
of the provincial capital tax. Despite eliminating the capital tax by 2011, Ontario
will continue to have the highest effective tax rate on capital (33.5 percent). This
unfortunate distinction will be a result of a high provincial corporate income tax
rate (14 percent) and high retail sales taxes on capital inputs.
Quebec’s effective tax rate on capital will decrease from 25.2 to 22.3 percent
during the period 2007 to 2011. The reductions in federal corporate income tax
rates and the elimination of the Quebec capital tax improve competitiveness, but
are partly offset by an increase in the Quebec corporate income tax rate from 9.9
percent in 2007 to 11.9 percent by 2011 and the expiration of special preferences.
Quebec would have been better off to have accelerated the elimination of capital
taxes and kept its corporate income tax rate closer to the Alberta rate of 10 percent,
which is lowest amongst the provinces. To compensate for fiscal losses, Quebec
could have scaled back or eliminated a substantial list of targeted tax measures
aimed at particular business activities, small business and regional investments.
Breaking down effective tax rates into components — federal and provincial
corporate income taxes, provincial sales taxes and capital taxes (Table 3) — the
federal effective tax rate on capital in 2007 in the four Atlantic Provinces is
negative as a result of the Atlantic investment tax credit.
16 In 2007, federal
16 The underlying assumption in these calculations is that any accelerated deductions and
investment tax credits are fully used to reduce taxes on infra-marginal investments, carried back
to shelter past taxes, carried forward to shelter future taxes or are flowed-out to investors holding
tax-shelter assets. However, when effective tax rates are highly negative, it is likely businesses ....10 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Figure 4a Effective Tax Rates on Capital Investment by Province – 











































Source: C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.
Figure 4b Effective Tax Rates on Capital Investment by Industry – 



















































Source: C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto. C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 11
corporate income taxes also discriminate against service industries, which are
taxed almost twice as highly as manufacturing and four times more than forestry
(Table 4).
Capital taxes on non-financial companies will be eliminated by 2011 in all
provinces (except Nova Scotia, which will do so by 2012), resulting in a reduction
in effective tax rates in Manitoba (8.1 percentage points), Ontario (4.0 percentage
points), New Brunswick (4.4 percentage points) and Saskatchewan (2.4 percentage
points). Quebec’s capital tax elimination will reduce the effective tax rate for
marginal investment by 3.3 percentage points, depending upon the impact of the
capital tax credits on marginal investments.
17
Retail sales taxes have a considerable impact on investments in some provinces
(Tables 3 and 4). If governments chose to harmonize their sales taxes with the
federal GST and eliminated sales tax on capital purchases, 2007 effective tax rates
footnote 16 cont’d
.... are unable to fully use accelerated deductions and credits so that the effective tax rate on
marginal investments approaches zero depending on the use of tax losses and credits to reduce
taxes elsewhere.
17 However, the effective tax rate on marginal investments would increase by 6 percentage points
with the elimination of Quebec's capital taxes if the capital taxes credits for manufacturing and
forestry in 2007 do not fully offset capital tax payments by manufacturing and forestry.
Table 3: Effective Tax Rates on Capital Investment by Province (in percent) – 









(percentage point change in parentheses)
Newfoundland & 
Labrador
-1.3 11.4 (12.7) 11.4 (0.0)  11.4 (0.0) 
Prince Edward Island -1.5 10.2 (11.7) 10.2 (0.0)  30.6 (20.3)
Nova Scotia -4.6 13.4 (18.0) 17.5 (4.1) 17.5 (0.0) 
New Brunswick -13.6 2.2 (15.8) 6.6 (4.4) 6.6 (0.0) 
Quebec 13.0 21.6 (8.6) 24.9 (3.3) 25.2 (0.3)
Ontario 13.8 24.1 (10.3) 28.1 (4.0) 37.0 (8.9)
Manitoba 13.8 15.3 (1.5) 23.4 (8.1) 32.5 (9.1)
Saskatchewan 13.5 19.1 (5.6) 21.5 (2.4) 30.2 (8.7)
Alberta 15.0 23.0 (8.0) 23.0 (0.0)  23.0 (0.0) 
British Columbia 13.8 23.1 (9.2) 23.1 (0.0)  31.6 (8.6)
Aggregate 12.9 22.3 (9.4) 25.0 (2.7) 30.9 (5.8)
Note:  * Quebec has increased its investment tax credit (ITC) against its capital tax for investment in Class 43
assets from 5% to 10% in general and to 15% for such assets used by forestry industry. The limitation
for this ITC is the total capital tax payable. Since Class 43 assets account for 52% and 35% of capital
used respectively by forestry and manufacturing industries, we assume that ITC available to these two
industries is sufficient to offset all the capital taxes payable on the new capital investment. But in the
case that such ITC is not sufficient to offset all the capital tax payable by these two industries, the
effective tax rate on capital for Quebec would be 9 percentage points lower in 2007. Note that this ITC
does not affect the effective tax rates for other industries since they virtually do not use Class 43.
Source:  C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.on capital would noticeably decline in British Columbia (8.6 percentage points),
Ontario (8.9 percentage points), Manitoba (9.1 percentage points), Prince Edward
Island (20.3 percentage points) and Saskatchewan (8.7 percentage points).
However, if provincial sales tax revenues are kept constant, the effective tax rate
on labour would rise as sales taxes are shifted from capital investment.
Nonetheless, competitiveness would improve overall, given the sharp reduction in
effective tax rates on capital.
What Canadians Should Conclude
This round of federal and provincial budgets provided opportunities for
governments to reduce taxes, especially for the federal government, which has the
fiscal room to reduce taxes the most. Even though the provinces have growing
commitments to fund health, education, welfare and social services, they too have
been in position to offer some tax reductions this past year. However, tax relief has
been targeted rather than broad in application. Canadians should be wary of all-
knowing governments resorting to these targeted measures.
Although some governments have happily continued the course of reducing
personal income tax rates (Newfoundland and Labrador), corporate income tax
rates (the federal government) and provincial capital taxes (Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan), far greater use of these special
provisions for tax relief is a harbinger of a massive erosion of tax bases, creating
inefficiency, unfairness and complexity.
Canadian governments should get back to an agenda of tax reform, looking to
reduce personal and corporate rates to internationally acceptable levels while
keeping tax bases broad and neutral. This is the only approach that makes sense if
policies are to maximize economic growth while ensuring fairness in the tax system.
12 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Table 4: Effective Tax Rates on Capital Investment by Industry (in percent) – 









(percentage point change in parentheses)
Forestry 4.5 12.1 (7.6) 13.7 (1.6) 16.1 (2.4)
Manufacturing 9.4 17.1 (7.7) 20.0 (2.9) 23.1 (3.1)
Construction 17.3 28.4 (11.1) 31.1 (2.7) 40.0 (8.9)
Transportation  12.1 20.5 (8.4) 23.0 (2.5) 27.1 (4.1)
Communications 15.1 25.1 (10.0) 28.7 (3.6) 40.2 (11.5)
Public utility 12.8 23.4 (10.6) 24.8 (1.3) 29.0 (4.2)
Wholesale Trade 18.3 29.5 (11.2) 32.7 (3.2) 38.1 (5.4)
Retail Trade 18.2 29.5 (11.3) 32.3 (2.8) 36.8 (4.5)
Other services 17.0 27.5 (10.5) 30.0 (2.5) 37.4 (7.4)
Aggregate 12.9 22.3 (9.4) 25.0 (2.7) 30.9 (5.8)
Source:  C.D. Howe Institute and International Tax Program, University of Toronto.References
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